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Reconciling facts with fiction  
Minimum wages in a Post-Keynesian Perspective 
 
by Arne Heise 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There has long been a discussion about the employment impact of minimum wages and 
this discussion has recently been renewed with the introduction of an economy-wide, 
binding minimum wage in Germany in 2015. In traditional reasoning, based on the 
allocational approach of modern labour market economics, it has been suggested that 
the impact is clearly negative on the assumption of a competitive labour market and 
clearly positive on the assumption of a monopsonistic labour market. Unfortunately, 
both predictions conflict with the empirical findings, which do not show a clear-cut 
impact of significant size in any direction. 
A post-Keynesian employment market, based on a different pre-analytical vision of the 
economy than traditional mainstream economics, is presented here. Its most likely 
prediction of a negligible impact is very much in line with the empirical evidence. 
Key words: Post-Keynesianism, minimum wage, aggregate demand, aggregate supply     
JEL codes: B50, E12, E23, J31 
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1. Introduction 
The discussion about minimum wages is an old one
1
. The introduction of a minimum 
wage in Germany in 2015 added yet another chapter to that discussion
2
. While most 
mainstream economists – represented by the majority position within the German 
Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) – claim that there is a negative 
employment effect, particularly for lower-skilled and young, inexperienced workers 
(see SVR 2013: 284ff.), progressive or dissenting economists – represented by the 
minority position within the German Council of Economic Experts – argue that a 
minimum wage will actually increase the quantity of employment (see SVR 2013: 
289f., Bofinger 2014: 164ff.). 
Both positions are based on a partial analysis of the labour market using allocational 
reasoning. Assuming the ordinary labour market to be characterized by perfect 
competition – as the mainstream position does – a minimum wage will undoubtedly 
have significantly negative employment effects once the minimum wage is higher than 
the market-clearing wage rate associated with the respective skill level
3
. This is so, 
because any job that does not earn its labour cost, i.e. where the (minimum) wage rate is 
higher than the marginal productivity of that job, will eventually be priced out of the 
market. And a minimum wage that is set below the market-clearing wage rate would 
clearly be useless. This straightforward result, based on the pre-analytical vision of the 
labour market being the operator of intertemporal exchange between (real) income, 
leisure time and postponed consumption, can only be altered without challenging that 
pre-analytical vision by refuting the assumption of perfect competition. Assuming a 
monopsonistic labour market, i.e. a labour market with one (dominant) employer, a 
minimum wage rate set between the profit-maximizing wage rate of the monopsonistic 
firm and the maximum wage rate associated with the productivity of the same quantity 
of employment will increase the level of employment and reduce the mark-down on 
wages (see, e.g., Manning 2003; Ashenfelter/Farber/Ransom 2010).  
Both models present clear cut and opposing predictions about the impact of minimum 
wage rates on employment and it should, therefore, be easy to evaluate these theories 
empirically: As there are many countries with long histories of minimum wage 
legislation (Neumark/Wascher 2008: 9ff., ILO 2014), we should be in a position to 
falsify either of the two models or, rather, the assumptions on which they rest. Alas, 
meta-studies on the minimum wage (see, e.g., Doucouliagos/Stanley 2009; 
Wolfson/Belman 2014) paint a perplexing picture: “Economists have conducted 
hundreds of studies of the employment impact of the minimum wage. Summarizing 
those studies is a daunting task, but two recent meta-studies analyzing the research 
conducted since the early 1990s concludes that the minimum wage has little or no 
discernible effect on the employment prospects of low-wage workers” (Schmitt 2013: 
22).  
There are two possible ways to tackle the question of why this is the case. (1) 
Remaining within the traditional pre-analytic vision (i.e. accepting the ontological 
dimensions of the mainstream paradigm), one has to find “channels of adjustment” that 
                                                 
1
 For an overview, see Neumark/Salas/Wascher (2014). 
2
 See e.g. Heitger 2003, Franz 2007, Bauer/Kluve/Schaffner/Schmidt 2009, Paloyo/Schaffner/Schmidt 
2013. 
3
 Most simulation studies for Germany predicted a loss of more than one million jobs (i.e. about 3% of 
total employment!) if the current minimum wage of 8,50€ was introduced (see, e.g., Schuster 2013: 33). 
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could stop managers from firing workers as would be expected by the ordinary 
competitive market model (see Hirsch/Kaufman/Zelenska 2011: 1; Schmitt 2013: 11ff.): 
increasing productivity via training or lower labour-turnover or reducing the effect of 
nominal minimum wages on real minimum wages by allowing the cost to be passed on 
in the form of price increases. Of course, one could also assume that real world labour 
markets may be partly competitive (in some regions) and partly monopsonistic (in other 
regions): Depending on the employment shares of both market structures, this would 
cancel out positive and negative employment effects. (2) If one turns to a different pre-
analytical vision – which would mean a truly heterodox approach4 – then a different 
prediction about the impact of minimum wages on employment becomes possible: one 
which is better in line with the empirical picture.  
This is exactly what the present paper attempts to provide. Taking the empirical 
evidence as a strong disincentive to accepting the traditional reasoning, we will provide 
a model of a post-Keynesian ‘employment market’ that not only suggests a 
macroeconomic frame, but is based on a pre-analytic vision of the economy as a system 
of nominal obligations (part 2)
5
. This general model needs to be restructured in such a 
way as to portray the effect of minimum wages on employment. As the effect of 
minimum wages is to hamper wage dispersion, or even to shrink the lower bound 
thereof, in order to avoid ‘unfair’ wages (or, morally speaking, ‘exploitation’) for that 
part of the labour force that is no longer covered by collective agreements (see 
Bachmann et al. 2008: 28ff.), we can rely on a two-sector model created to discuss the 
employment effects of growing wage dispersion (part 3). Finally, we need to judge the 
likely effect of minimum wages on employment under alternative assumptions 
regarding the parameters involved (part 4). 
 
2. A Post-Keynesian Model of the Employment Market 
Post-Keynesianism is a portmanteau term for a variety of quite different heterodox 
approaches. By relying closely on the ideas presented in Chap. 2 of Keynes’ magnum 
opus, fundamentalist or monetary Keynesianism appears to have elaborated the most 
highly-visible approach to providing an alternative to the ordinary labour market of the 
neoclassical mainstream (see e.g. Weintraub 1957, Davidson/Smolensky 1964, 
Davidson 1994, Kregel 1984/85)
6
. Monetary Keynesianism does not only forcefully 
reject Walras’ law as (positive or negative) heuristic (see Heise 2017), it also provides a 
                                                 
4
 For a theoretical deduction of heterodox economics, see Heise/Thieme (2016: 1107ff.). 
5
 To my knowledge, there are only three post-Keynesian studies on minimum wages, of which one is not 
in English (Seccareccia 1991) and the other two rather broad in nature (Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-
Praprotnik 2009; Herr/Kazandziska 2011).  
6
 Of course, ever since Franco Modigliani’s extension of Hicks’ ISLM interpretation of Keynes’ General 
Theory (see Modigliani 1944), the labour market and employment determinantion have played a 
significant role in those economic approaches that are termed ‘Keynesian’. However, to my knowledge, 
other than monetary Keynesianism, there is no other post-Keynesian approach that attempts explicitly 
to reject traditional labour market reasoning and to take seriously Keynes’ claim that the real wage is no 
exogenous control or distributive device, but is endogenously determined pari passu with the quantity 
of employment. Therefore, Lavoie’s approach (Lavoie 2014: 280ff.) is not followed here which – based 
on the conception of market rationing – rejects the idea of a ‘well-behaved’ uniquely negative 
employment-real wage relation with respect to effective as opposed to notional demand configurations. 
His intention is to introduce functional (not personal!) income distribution into employment 
determination but not to reject traditional real wage modelling altogether. 
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microeconomically-based, yet macroeconomically-embedded employment 
determination that turns the quantity-price nexus of mainstream labour markets upside 
down. It is not the real wage rate that causally governs labour supply and demand until 
equilibrium is reached at the full employment level; but rather the quantity of labour 
demanded and supplied (at the level where real wage and profit expectations are 
fulfilled and, therefore, a stable position beyond the market-clearing point is reached) is 
determined endogenously and simultaneously with the real wage rate
7
. The employment 
market
8
, as will be developed below, cannot, therefore, be considered by way of a 
partial analysis, independently of its macro-economic environment. We will, thus, have 
first to outline a post-Keynesian macro model, before we concentrate – but always 
keeping the macro-economic links in mind – on the employment market.     
The stylised post-Keynesian model presented here is an elaboration of Setterfield 
(2006), Heise (2008) and Pusch/Heise (2010). It comprises 10 structural, behavioural 
and definitional equations. The structural equations depict the post-Keynesian core of 
the model. The behavioural equations refer to empirically-based descriptions of 
behaviour of macroeconomic actors (e.g. the policy of the Central Bank) that might be 
subject to change and, in any case, does not affect the paradigmatic core. We start with 
the demand equation:  
 
),,,,(=
_
ttt LGmIwD  ,      (1) 
where D  is the value of aggregate demand, which evolves as a function of (given) 
nominal wages 
_
w , nominal private investment outlays I , the (given) investment 
multiplier m , (given) governmental spending G , and labour employed L . 
The supply relation is:  
 
).,,(=
_
tt LTwZ         (2) 
Z  is the value of aggregate supply. T  denotes (given) technology. The next equation is 
an equilibrium condition:  
 
.tt ZD          (3) 
The price level p depends on the nominal (given) wage rate 
_
w , given technology and a 
given mark-up 
_
 :  
 
).,,(=
__
 Twpt        (4) 
                                                 
7
 „…, and the volume of employment is uniquely related to a given level of real wages – not the other 
way round“ (Keynes 1936: 30). 
8
 Throughout this paper, I will call the virtual place of employment determination from a post-Keynesian 
perspective the ‘employment market’, in order to distinguish it from the ordinary ‘labour market’ of 
neoclassical provenance. 
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The model also includes an equation for the output gap:  
 
,= Trendt
gap
t YYY         (5) 
where Y  is real income and Trend
Y
 is (given) trend income. Real income 
 
),,(= TLKY tt         (6) 
is dependent on production factors and technology. L  is the level of employment 
determined by  eq. (3), K  is the (given) stock of real capital. The next equation 
describes nominal private investment outlays:  
 
),(= EiI tt          (7) 
which depend on a (given) schedule of expected profit rates E  and the long-term 
interest rate i . The latter is determined by the following equation:  
 
).,(= PLii CBtt         (8) 
Here the Central Bank's instrument variable 
CB
ti  comes in to play, as does the (given) 
schedule of liquidity preferences PL . 
Lastly, we provide a behavioural equation for the CB's interest rate:  
 
),(= gapt
gap
t
CB
t Ypi         (9) 
which depends on the price gap 
gapp  and the output gap. The price gap is defined by  
 
,= *ppp t
gap
t         (10) 
where p stands for the actual price level and 
*p  is the (given) targeted price level
9
. 
The model comprises an aggregate demand-aggregate supply section (eq. 1–3) 
determining the equilibrium employment level, an ordinary production function (eq. 6), 
mark-up pricing (eq. 4), a (Taylor-rule) monetary reaction function (eq. 9–10 and 5) 
portraying the money and credit market and endogenously (and only implictly) 
determining the quantity of money, and a Keynesian investment function (eq. 7). The 
model is distinctly post-Keynesian in nature inasmuch as: the employment level 
depends on the propensity to consume, the incentive to invest, the nature of long-term 
expectations, and liquidity preference considerations (see Keynes (1936: 250); money is 
endogenously created; and nominal investment outlays (“finance”) generate the nominal 
obligations on which a monetary economy is based. 
                                                 
9
 Typically, eq. (4) and eq. (10) are expressed in terms of rates of change (i.e. inflation rates and rates of 
change of wages). For the sake of simplicity, levels (i.e. price levels and wage rates) are used here. 
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The post-Keynesian employment market is depicted by the aggregate demand – 
aggregate supply section (eq. 1 – 3) and has first been elaborated by the late Sidney 
Weintraub (1957). As shown in fig. 1, overall employment is determined by the 
intersection of the aggregate demand curve D and the aggregate supply curve Z. The D-
curve is the aggregation of firms’ expectations about nominal revenues taking the 
nominal wage rate as given. The Z-curve is the aggregation of firms’ nominal costs 
associated with a certain level of employment, the given nominal wage rate, technology, 
and fixed capital stock. The resultant quantity of employment in the overall economy is 
thus the number of jobs made available by employers under profit maximization 
principles in a world of fundamental uncertainty.  
Fig. 1: Employment determination in a Z-D-model 
 
 
 
 
 
      
               
 
Whether L* equals the quantity of employment supplied by households at the ruling 
wage rate, surpasses it or falls short of it, cannot be predicted with accuracy – in 
economic history, we have experienced all three constellations
10
. What can be said with 
some certainty is that a mature economy with a large capital stock (i.e. low marginal 
efficiency of capital), high income and saturation level (i.e. low marginal propensity to 
consume), and high labour market participation rates for both men and women will be 
far less likely to secure full employment than an economy with lower capital stock (i.e. 
higher marginal efficiency of capital), lower income and saturation levels (i.e. higher 
marginal propensity to consume), and lower labour market participation rates. What can 
also be said is that any disequilibrium between supply and demand of employment 
cannot easily be cured by curtailing wage aspirations (see e.g. Davidson 1994: 179ff.), 
as the nominal wage rate (which is the appropriate controlable variable) enters equally 
into both aggregate demand and supply functions – graphically acting as a shift 
parameter that leaves the intersection of the curves unaltered with respect to the quantity 
of employment
11
. Therefore, Keynes and post-Keynesians favour(ed) a wage regime 
                                                 
10
 Post-war (West) German economic history, for instance, showed a period of ‚excess employment‘ up 
until the early 1970s (when migrant labour was invited into Germany to close the gap), full 
employment‘ until the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s and unemployment ever since. 
11
 This result rests on two assumptions: (1) a closed economy; and (2) endogenous money. Of course, the 
assumption of a closed economy is not very realistic. But the introduction of external economic 
relations does not necessarily produce a different result (this depends on the exchange rate system) or 
would imply a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy. The second assumption is, of course, a basic post-
Keynesian assumption, which undermines the likelihood of positive real-balance effects in favour of 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
Quantity of 
employment 
).,,(=
_
tt LTwZ 
 
),,,,(=
_
ttt LGmIwD 
 
L* 
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that is able to introduce some downward rigidity as an institutional device for 
safeguarding the stability of the economic system
12
.  
It is necessary to point out at this stage that a labour market in which supply and 
demand for labour is equilibrated by real wage movements does not exist in any 
operative way (see, e.g., Lucas 1981: 242; Darity/Horn 1988: 220; Heise 2017). Real 
wages can neither be determined exogenously by the parties to collective bargaining nor 
by individual actors, but will be determined in line with employment and the price-level 
once the nominal wage rate is set and the production technology is given. Taking the 
common features of a ‘well-behaved’ production function for granted (eq. 6), higher 
employment is ceteris paribus associated with a lower real wage rate. But this 
correlation cannot be turned into a causality running from lower real wages to higher 
employment. 
3. A Sectoral Refinement 
In order to discuss the effect of minimum wages on employment, we need to portray a 
two-sector model of the post-Keynesian employment market (see Heise 1998; Heise 
1999): sector A comprises all firms that are affected by the minimum wage and sector B 
comprises all firms that pay wages above the minimum wage level (see fig. 2)
13
. 
LA and LB denote the quantities of employment in sector A and B respectively
14
; u 
depicts unemployment. What we are interested in is the impact of an increase in the 
nominal wage rate in sector A up to the level of a fixed minimum wage rate, while the 
wage rate in sector B stays unchanged. As elaborated in Heise (1998: 254ff.), the 
sectoral employment effect of a change in the sectoral wage rate depends on the relative 
weight of the ‘substitution effect’ of relative price changes of commodities (i.e. the 
respective sectoral price elasticities of demand) and the ‘income effect’ of (wage) 
income changes (i.e. the respective income elasticities of demand). The overall 
employment effect can be summarized as follows
15
: 
N° = k (ηA,A +  ηB,A – εA – 1) wA° + (1 – k) (ηB,B +  ηA,B -  εB – 1) wB°  (11) 
                                                                                                                                               
negative real-balance effects in case of a severe deflationary process. 
12
 “In the light of these considerations I am now of the opinion that the maintenance of a stable general 
level of money-wages is, on the balance of considerations, the most advisable policy for a closed 
system; …” (Keynes 1936: 270). 
13
 Of course, sector A will comprise firms from many different industrial sectors and branches. In 
Germany, most firms with most of the employees that will be affected by the minimum wage 
legislation are from branches such as agriculture, forestry and fishing, retail, transportation, food and 
beverages, and hotels and restaurants (see Bellmann et al. 2015). 
14
 In different studies (see Knabe/Schöb/Thum 2014; Brenke/Müller 2013; Falck et al 2013; 
Heumer/Lesch/Schröder 2013; Kalina/Weinkopf 2013), the percentage of employees affected by the 
minimum wage in Germany, i.e. LA, ranges between 14% - 20% of total employment. 
15
 Specifying eq. 1 and eq. 2 and assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that only wage earners consume 
and no governmental spending, we get: Zi= (πi/ωi) wi Ni and Di = ci,i wi Ni + cj,i wj Nj + Ii with πi = 
average labour productivity in sector i and ωi = marginal labour productivity in sector i; wi = nominal 
wage rate in sector i and Ni = empoyment in sector i; ci,j = marginal propensity to consume 
commodities from sector j of wage earners from sector i and Ii = (autonomous) investment spending on 
commodities of sector i. Now, the rate of change of employment with respect the rate of change of the 
nominal wage rate depends on the relative rate of change of the D- and Z-functions: Ni° | wi° = ci,i° Ni° - 
(πi° - ωi°). Defining  ci,i° = ηi,i ;  πi° - ωi° = εi  and k = share of employment in sector i (and, respectively, 
(1-k) as employment share of sector j), we get: N° = k (ηi,i +  ηj,i – εi – 1) wi° + (1 – k) (ηj,j +  ηi,j -  εj – 
1) wj°.  
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(εi = absolute value of the own price-elasticity of demand for commodities of sector i;  
ηi,j  = income-elasticity of demand of wage earners of sector j for commodities of sector 
I;k = employment share of sector A; ° denotes the rate of growth [percentage change] 
of a variable) 
 
Figure 2: A Post Keynesian 2-sector-model of the employment market 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming the absence of ‘money illusion’, an increase of nominal wages in both sectors 
at the same rate will cause prices to increase accordingly (eq. 4) and – relative prices 
being unaltered – the quantity of employment will not be affected: i.e. N° = 0 as long as 
the price increase does not trigger a contractionary monetary reaction by the central 
bank (eq. 10). 
But what is the outcome if wages increase in one sector only? Let us assume the 
introduction of a fixed, binding minimum wage for all branches, resulting in an increase 
of the nominal wage rate in sector A by x%, while the nominal wage rate in sector B 
stays unchanged: 
 
    wA° = x 
   wB° = 0 
Disregarding cross-price elasticities of demand and any possible reaction from the 
central bank, the employment effect will be
16
: 
                                                 
16
 Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik (2009: 12) come to the following conclusion with respect to 
employment effects of minimum wages in a post-Keynesian approach: „…:minimum wages will 
change the structure of wages, the structure of prices, the structure of demand for final products and the 
structure of demand  for  inputs. How employment is affected is theoretically open and extremely 
difficult to predict empirically.” If ‘theoretically open’ is to mean that there may be different post-
Keynesian model specifications with potentially different results, the statement is correct but also 
somewhat trivial. And whether the effects are ‘extremely difficult to predict’ depends on the specific 
model specification – formal specifications as opposed to narrative approaches, at least, offer the 
charme to make prediction rather easy. Whether such predictions can easily be falsified empirically, is 
LA u LB 
ZA 
D
A 
DB 
Z
B 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
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   NA° = k (ηA,A – εA – 1) wA° + (1 - k) ηA,B wB° (12) 
   NA° | wA° = k (ηA,A – εA – 1) x   (12a) 
   NB° = (1 – k) (ηB,B – εB – 1) wB° +  k ηB,A wA° (13) 
    NB° | wA° = k ηB,A x      (13a) 
   N° | wA° = k (ηA,A +  ηB,A – εA – 1) x   (14) 
The ‘substitution effect’ is given by the magnitude of the price-elasticity of demand for 
those commodities produced by workers affected by the minimum wage legislation, εA; 
the ‘income effect’ is determined by the income elasticities of demand of those workers 
affected by the minimum wage for commodities from sector A, ηA,A, and for 
commodities from sector B, ηB,A (see eq. 14). From eq. 12a and eq. 13a, the respective 
sectoral impacts of the introduction of a minimum wage in sector A can be specified. 
Obviously, they will be of different magnitude and they might also be of different sign: 
While sector B might gain from minimum wages in sector A (income effect), sector A 
itself will have to weigh the positive income effect against the negative substitution 
effect. Most likely, the employment impact in sector B will be positive, while it will be 
negative in sector A (see Fig. 3). 
 
Figure 3: A Post Keynesian employment market with minimum wage 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: mw denotes the respective function or variable after the introduction of a 
minimum wage 
LA u LB 
ZA 
DA 
DB 
ZB 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
 
LA(mw) LB(mw) u 
ZA (mw) 
DB(mw) DA(mw) 
 
4. Discussion 
From chapter 19 of the General Theory, we can infer that Keynes was rather skeptical 
about the positive effect of wage reductions on employment outcomes. Contrary to 
                                                                                                                                               
yet another question and depends on the testability of the theoretical predictors. But, maybe, that is 
what they meant by ‘extremely difficult to predict empirically’.     
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neoclassical labour market theory
17
, Keynes argued that both moderate wage reductions 
and moderate wage increases, which result in neither massive deflationary nor massive 
inflationary pressure, will affect the price level, but not the total quantity of employment 
(see Keynes 1936: 267). It is only once wage changes trigger a contractionary monetary 
reaction or markedly increase the real burden of nominal obligations that negative 
employment effects are likely to occur. 
Keynes, however, assumed a single nominal wage rate for all firms (by transforming 
different types of labour into ‘ordinary labour’) and thus concentrated on change in the 
general wage level, while ignoring the possible effects of a change in the wage 
structure. In order to shift our attention to precisely this object of inquiry, we had to 
refine the simple post-Keynesian employment market model by introducing two 
different sectors, A and B, in which the nominal wage rates wA and wB differ and may 
change in different ways. As we have seen, the sectoral, as well as total, employment 
effect of a change in the wage structure due to the introduction of a general, binding 
minimum wage depends on the respective magnitudes of the income- and price-
elasticities of demand. 
In order to predict the effect of a minimum wage in sector A, we would have to estimate 
the price-elasticity of demand for those commodities affected by the introduction of a 
minimum wage and the income-elasticities of demand of the wage-earners of sector A. 
This, alas, poses serious problems
18
. While the income-elasticities of wage-earners 
affected by a minimum wage can be reasonably assumed to be quite high (i.e. around 
the magnitude of 1), the price-elasticities of demand for those commodities affected by 
the minimum wage may vary considerably as they are very different (see footnote 13).  
Tab. 1 summarises a number of parameter constellations that are possible, but not all 
equally likely.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment (Pigou 1933) which Keynes explicitly critisized in his General 
Theory, can still be seen as the foundation of modern labour market theory. 
18
 Taking with Keynes (1939; 1940) a rather skeptical approach to econometric methods, I refrain from 
own statistical interferences but rather rely on judging the likelihood of parameters..   
Heise: Minimum wages in a Post-Keynesian Perspective 
11 
 
Tab. 1: Employment impact of minimum wages under different parameter 
constellations 
Price- and income 
elasticities of demand 
Employment impact Likelihood 
 
 
ηA,A = 1; ηB,A = 1 
 
a) |εA| = 1 
b) |εA| > 1 
c) |εA| < 1 
 
Total 
 
 
 
° 
- 
+ 
Sector A 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
+° 
Sector B 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
High 
Medium 
Low 
 
ηA,A < 1; ηB,A < 1 
 
d) |εA| = 1 
e) |εA| > 1 
f) |εA| < 1 
 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
°- 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
Medium – high 
Low – medium 
Low 
 
Note: ° no effect; °- very small negative effect, - small negative effect,  -- large negative 
effect,   +° very small positive effect, + small positive effect 
As already noted, it appears rather likely that the income-elasticity of low income 
earners – i.e. those that are affected by the minimum wage – is close to unity19. But it 
cannot completely be ruled out that it may be considerably lower than unity, if, for 
instance, minimum wage earners are beneficiaries of supplemental transfer income 
(‘Aufstocker’) or secondary wage earners (‘Zuverdiener’)20. And the price-elasticity of 
commodities of sector A can only be estimated from empirical research: Meta-studies 
on price-elasticities (Tellis 1988, Maurer 1995) show an enormous variation ranging 
from -10 to +2. According to these studies, the average price-elasticity is about –1,8. 
                                                 
19
 Dynan/Skinner/Zeldes (2004: 416) calculate savings ratios of the lowest income quintile between -22% 
and +9% depending on different income definitions. With such low savings ratios, the income elasticity 
proves to be close to unity (or even above).  
20
 Knabe/Schöb/Thum (2014: 147ff.) estimate that about 10% of all employees affected by a minimum 
wage in Germany are recipients of supplemental transfer income (‘Aufstocker’). 
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Taking into consideration a reporting bias
21
 and the fact that these empirical elasticities 
are measured by way of partial analysis (i.e. assuming changes only in the relative price 
of the one commodity under investigation), whereas the introduction of a minimum 
wage will affect many commodities and thus the relative price impact on the single 
commodity will be lower, the assumption of (close to) unity price-elasticity appears 
justified, but a higher magnitude is not entirely unlikely.      
A final thought shall be given to the case of a monopsonistic labour market. Although I 
am skeptical about the empirical relevance of such a market structure
22
, the 
monopsonistic labour market model has received considerable attention because it 
appeared to be the only theoretical foundation for those who attempted to reject the 
glooming negative employment outcome of minimum wages as exposed by the ordinary 
competitive labour market model. We have presented a different approach challenging 
this commonly negative employment effect – however, it may be of interest to see what 
difference the labour market structure makes within a post-Keynesian model. And it is 
here that the Lavoie-model becomes a potentially useful analytical tool: The Lavoie-
model (see Lavoie 2014: 280ff.) claims to be able to analyse the importance of 
functional income distribution for the determination of employment by introducing the 
distinction between notional and effective labour demand (see Fig. 4):  The ‘notional’ 
demand for labour is basically portrayed by the ordinary negatively sloped labour 
demand curve assuming decreasing labour productivity but disregarding demand 
constraints from the commodity market. Such constraints are integrated into the 
construction of a hump-shaped ‘effective’ demand curve for labour assuming the 
demand for commodities (and, therefore, the demand for labour under the condition of a 
given technique and capital stock) out of consumption spending by wage-earners and 
(given) autonomous spending by capitalists. Assuming that wage-earners spend all their 
wage income, effective labour demand is primarily dependent on the autonomous 
spending of capitalists who earn what they spent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 “The ‘file drawer hypothesis’ suggests there may be many studies that are unpublished because their 
results are not consistent with the normal expectation of a significantly negative price elasticity. The 
negatively skewed distribution of elasticities…seems to support this hypothesis” (Tellis 1988: 337). 
22
 There are only very few studies adressing the empirics of monopsonistic labour markets. Most of them 
concentrate on very narrow regional, industry-specific markets (e.g. Ransom/Sims 2010) and estimate 
the wage-elasticity of labour supply (e.g. Falch 2010, Staiger/Spetz/Phibbs 2010, Booth/Katic 2011). 
For Germany, Bachmann/Frings (2015) report, quite in line with most of these other studies, wage 
elasticities which appear to be low enough not to assume perfectly competitive labour markets. 
Moreover, they appear to be industry-specific with only a few low-wage industries (such as Hotels and 
Restaurants) showing wage-elasticities of a magnitude that might indicate market power for firms. In 
any case, a monopsony is characterized by restrictions on the demand- side of the market, not particular 
features on the supply-side. Therefore, it is debatable whether wage-elasticities are an appropriate 
measure for the monopsony-status of a certain market.       
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Figure 4: Notional and effective labour demand curves  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hump-shape of the effective labour demand curve indicates the respective change of 
the real wage in order to maintain commodity market clearing: The effective labour 
demand curve reaches a local maximum at the real wage rate (w/P)1, intersecting the 
notional labour demand curve at the employment level of L1. This is where the real 
wage rate just equals (marginal) labour productivity and portrays the situation of a 
competitive labour market. However, if the labour market is supposed to reflect a 
(regional) monopsony, the idea is that the monopsonistic firm may charge a mark-down 
on wages, pays only (w/P)2 and, thus changes functional income distribution in its own 
favour. Ceteris paribus, in order to maintain commodity market equilibrium, the 
monopsonistic company would either have to decrease employment to L2 or increase it 
to L3. This rather unfamiliar result originates from the fact that lower employment 
payed at the wage rate that equals its (marginal) labour productivity would create excess 
demand on the commodity market as long as autonomous capitalist spending is not 
reduced. And due to decreasing returns, the real wage-rate would also have to be 
reduced in the case when employment is increased to L3 in order to guanrantee 
commodity market equilibrium.   
Although employment would theoretically be indetermined in case of a change in 
functional income distribution, it appears more likely that L2 will be chosen by the 
monopsonistic firm as the curtailment of employment demand will be the device to 
reduce the real wage rate to (w/P)2 and the profit rate (not real profits which are constant 
along the effective demand curve) will be higher than in the case of L3. What this means 
is that any change in functional income distribution due to monopsonistic market power 
on the labour market will reduce the employment level as compared to a competitive 
market strcuture and, hence, any increase in the real wage rate between (w/P)2 and 
(w/P)1 due to minimum wage legislation will increase employment rather than lower it. 
This result appears quite in line with the foregoing post-Keynesian analysis indicating 
that the income effect of a minimum wage overcompensates the substitution effect. 
Of course, this result rests on a number of assumptions which have all been made 
explicite in the argumentation above, namely: a) (given) autonomous spending of the 
capitalists , b) the ability of the monopsonistic firm to impose a mark-down on the real 
wage rate and, thus, to influence functional income distribution. While the first 
assumption can be accepted as a partial analytical tool to isolate the labour market from 
w/P 
L 
L
D
 effective 
L
D
notional 
(w/P)1 
(w/P)2 
L1 L2 L3 
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its broader macroeconomic environment, yet for a determinantion of the employment 
level, spending of the capitalists must certainly be endogenized as it determines the 
exact location of the effective demand curve. The second assumption is more serious as 
it appears to contradict the post-Keynesian postulate of the endogeneity of real wages 
(see Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik 2009: 8). How are monopsonistic firms 
able to charge a mark-down on real wages if all they can control is the nominal wage 
rate? Of course, if the price level P is fixed, any reduction in the nominal wage rate w – 
forced by a reduction in labour demand as from L1 to L2 – would be enough to get the 
assumed result
23
. But why should the price level remain unaltered, if nominal spending 
and nominal wage costs fall? This could only be the case if incomplete competition – on 
the commodity market, not the labour market – would allow for a price-setting 
behaviour of the firms (see eq. 4). However, on the one hand that would be an 
additional assumption which is entirely unrelated to the assumption of a (regional) 
monopsony on the labour market and, even if assumed, would allow for the charging of 
a mark-up on prices irrespecftive of the market structure of the labour market the firm is 
acting in. On the other hand, even if a regional monopsony in the labour market is 
assumed, any decrease in the nominal wage rate due to market power in the labour 
market would be passed on to prices as long as the competitive structure in the 
commodity market does not change – only this would make it possible to raise the 
mark-up and, in this way, increase the mark-down on wages. Therefore, the analysis 
based on the Lavoie-model explains how functional income distribution – however 
derived - impacts on the demand for labour, yet it does not give support to the 
proposition that a (regional) monopsonistic labour market has any direct influence on 
the real wage rate and employment level and therefore, no independent argument can be 
derived from this analysis that would predict an increase in employment as the result of 
an economy-wide, binding minimum wage.                
5. Conclusion 
As shown in Tab. 1, the impact of the introduction of an economy-wide, binding 
minimum wage on overall employment in a post-Keynesian perspective is most likely 
to be negligible or at least very small, provided no contractionary monetary reaction is 
triggered. The picture may, however, look different if single branches or the whole of 
sector A, comprising all industries that are affected by the minimum wage, are taken 
separately. This result is very much in line with the empirical findings of the above-
mentioned meta-studies and appears to fit reality (with respect to deviant industry 
results; see e.g. Machin/Manning/Rahman 2003, König/Möller 2007) much better than 
either the neoclassical mainstream labour market model of perfect competition or that of 
monopsony. 
Moreover, the labour market structure has no impact of its own on functional income 
distribution and – other than its possible impact on the wage structure (i.e. personal 
income distribution) – on the employment level. Therefore, support for minimum wages 
in order to institutionally assist collective bargaining systems which can no longer 
protect low wage earners does not have to rest on theoretical foundations which are of 
dubious empirical significance.    
                                                 
23
 And that is obviously what Lavoie (2014: 283) has in mind when he equates an increase in nominal 
wages w with an increase with real wages w/P. 
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